a new study by the Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) states.
But that isn’t necessarily any cause for celebration in Western capitals. ISIS says Iran’s uranium industry as currently constituted cannot produce enough enriched uranium to keep even the single Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant operating, but can easily produce enough for nuclear weapons.
What’s more, the Islamic Republic doesn’t need to use any of the enriched uranium it makes to run Bushehr since the Russians have already contracted to fuel Bushehr for at least a decade.
ISIS says, “During the past year, the performance of the IR-1 centrifuges at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant has faltered.”
The report says, “It is widely known that the IR-1 centrifuge, based on the Pakistani centrifuge called the P-1, is not a reliable centrifuge. The P-1 centrifuge was derived from a [1950s] Dutch design that also suffered excessive machine breakage. The new performance data suggests that Iran has not succeeded in overcoming these design problems.”
ISIS says UN sanctions are helping to restrict Iran’s centrifuge program chiefly by constraining Iran’s ability to obtain maraging steel and carbon fiber. For example, ISIS says that centrifuge “rotor assemblies typically have maraging steel top and bottom caps. Iran is trying to replace maraging steel end caps with high strength aluminum end caps. Aluminum is weaker than maraging steel, so this substitution does not make technical sense unless maraging steel is in short supply.”
ISIS says Iran has also “failed on numerous occasions to buy high quality carbon fiber abroad” because of sanctions. In August, Iran announced it was building its own carbon fiber plant. “However,” said ISIS, “this carbon fiber is judged to be of relatively poor quality and not adequate for gas centrifuge rotors. Iran is assessed as still being dependent on illicit procurement of carbon fiber from abroad for its centrifuge program.”
All that is slowing the centrifuge program. Iran’s giant centrifuge hall at Natanz was designed to hold 54,000 centrifuges. It now has just 8,000 installed. It has not added to the number since August 2009. In part, that may be because the Stuxnet computer worm struck in September 2009 and set back Iran’s program.
ISIS also says the Natanz operation is less efficient than before Stuxnet. It says Iran was once able to extract one kilogram of 3.5 percent enriched uranium for every 10 kilos of unenriched uranium it fed into its centrifuges. This past year, ISIS says, Iran has had to feed 13 kilos of unenriched uranium to get one kilo of enriched uranium.
All of this is very bad news if Iran wants to produce fuel to operate a chain of nuclear power reactors, as it says. “Most would rate [Natanz] as a failure from a commercial point of view. It is unlikely to ever produce enough LEU [low enriched uranium of 3.5 percent purity] for a nuclear power reactor of the size of the Bushehr power reactor,” ISIS says.
“The question becomes: Is the Iranian enrichment program on a trajectory toward being dedicated to producing weapon-grade uranium for nuclear weapons? Unfortunately, despite its severe limitations, this program is able to do so” because weapons require far less uranium than power plants and Iran is still pumping out sufficient enrichment uranium each month to build weapons.
ISIS points to another suspicion about the Iranian program. It says Iran now has stockpiled more than enough 20 percent enriched uranium to fuel its small Tehran reactor, which is used to make medical isotopes. But, ISIS says, Iran is continuing to feed all the 3.5 percent enriched uranium it makes at Natanz into the centrifuges it uses to make 20 percent enriched fuel—a giant step along the road to producing the 90 percent fuel required for weapons.
