February 17, 2023
The political protests in the streets have slackened off to very small numbers across the country, but this has not satisfied the regime establishment, which seems to understand it has lost touch with the people and can’t figure out what to do about that. Most importantly, the public attitude has changed dramatically and the regime establishment recognizes that the majority of the public no longer supports the regime and wants it gone.
For the first decades of the regime, the attitude of most of the public that did not support the revolution was resignation. People said Iran had already had two revolutions, neither of which worked to the country’s benefit, so why try another. But since the outbreak of the protests that started September 16, the opposition has made clear by its chants that it wants another revolution. That is a seismic change and a change that has penetrated the regime establishment.
There are, however, other kinds of protests besides rallies and marches. Most women in northern Tehran now walk around without any head covering, for example. Also, the evening hours are replete with anti-regime chants heard from rooftops in many parts of cities. And labor strikes appear to have proliferated in recent months. What’s more, as fast as the regime put up giant posters to mark the 44th anniversary of the revolution, regime opponents began lighting them on fire. In addition, opposition messaging has called on the public to destroy the thousands of security cameras the police installed in recent years all around Tehran and other cities, though there is no way of knowing how successful that has been.
The establishment appears to have split into three groups: first, a small minority of ultras that advocates harsh repression to regain control, including executions; second, what appears to be the vast majority that wants to concede major policy changes to try to win back public support; and, third, a minority (epitomized by former Prime Minister Mir-Hossein Musavi) that has given up on the revolution and wants an entirely new regime.
That third group was believed to be very small, but in recent days more than 500 activists have signed statements backing Musavi’s stand, including Faezeh Hashemi, daughter of the late President Ali-Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani,
It is the change in public attitude from tolerating the regime to rejecting it that is the key change since September. The street protests themselves are no longer key.
There were at least some protests somewhere in the country every single day from September 16, when Mahsa Amini died while in police custody, through January 10—an unprecedented total of 116 days of uninterrupted protests. But then no protests were recorded on January 11 and 12, according to the Critical Risks Project of the Washington-based American Enterprise Institute and the Center for the Study of War, which have been tracking the protests and issuing daily reports since they began.
The protests began slackening in late November, becoming fewer in number and much smaller in size. The last time the Critical Risks Project (CRP) reported a “large” demonstration, meaning more than 1,000 participants, was in November. In the first half of February, the CRP recorded an average of just 1.7 protests a day rated “small,” involving fewer than 100 participants each, and two protests rated “medium to large” (100 to 1,000 participants), with both of those in Zahedan.
It isn’t clear why so few people are turning out now to protest, though most suspect the extremely cold winter has been a major factor. The long period of 116 straight days with marches unheard of in all the previous intervals of protests may also have been a factor, though that wasn’t 116 days of protests in every city. Many cities saw weekly protests or even less frequent outbreaks. There is also a debate over whether the regime’s brutality in trying to quell the opposition led to rallies fading out or only embedded popular frustration with the regime.
Most of the activity since the start of 2023 has been in Kurdish cities and in Zahedan, a mainly Baluchi city. The regime has focused its attention there. It has sent large numbers of troops to both restive areas. They have confronted Kurdish protests violently, but they have allowed the protests in Zahedan to proceed without confronting them since a very deadly suppression September 30.
In Kurdish areas, there is no obvious leadership, but the encouragement to protest likely comes from exiled Kurds living across the border in Iraq.
In Zahedan, the leadership clearly comes from the senior Sunni cleric, Mowlana Abdol Hamid Esmail-Zehi, who is allowed to continue preaching every Friday. The regime seems to tolerate him because he does not promote disorder—although he has been quite critical of the authorities in Tehran. But as long as he is able to restrain his followers from rioting, Tehran seems prepared to put up with him. The regime has put up roadblocks on highways leading into the city to stop out-of-towners from further bloating the sizable Friday rallies.
The Critical Threats Project, however, says that Esmail-Zehi’s sermons, which line up with former Prime Minister Musavi’s ideology, have “so clearly crossed Khamenehi’s red line that the regime will appear weak if it takes no action against him. But the regime clearly fears taking action could inflame not only Zahedan and Sistan and Baluchistan Province but also the larger Iranian Sunni minority,” which comprises about 10 percent of the country’s population.
Opposition leadership groups, which call themselves Neigborhood Youth Associations, uniformly called for major street protests on February 16 to mark the 40th day since the executions of two protesters. The result was the largest turnout in months with 15 demonstrations countrywide. But they were very small. the Critical Threats Project rated 14 as drawing fewer than 100 people and only one in Tehran drawing from 100 to 1,000. That means that at maximum all the protests together attracted no more actually less than 2,400 people.
The sponsors made a major effort to publicize the protests, with one group saying it even printed notices on banknotes.
The regime is still cracking down on the opposition. But it appears to be releasing more people from jail than it is arresting now. Most prominently, it freed film director Jafar Panahi in early February. Panahi, 62, had been arrested last summer, long before the protests began in September. But he is one of the “influencers” that the regime sees as encouraging disorder and opposition.
Acts of repression have by no means ended. For example, in mid-February Zabol University expelled at least 16 students, both men and women, for committing one of the great offenses of the day dining together rather than taking their food from the cafeteria line to segregated areas.
The worst of the repression is being modified, however. According to the Iran Human Rights Organization, based in Oslo, the death told reached 488 as of January 27. That was an increase of only 30 from the 458 deaths the group estimated on December 7, almost two months earlier. That came to one new death every other day, not an insignificant toll, but far from the average 5-1/2 deaths per day before December 7.
More than half the deaths have been recorded in Kurdish and Baluchi areas, underscoring the strength of opposition in minority areas. (There have also been many deaths in Torkoman areas.)
Aside from freeing some influencers it has arrested, the regime’s main effort to appease the public was the annual amnesty announced for the anniversary of the revolution. The Supreme Leader normally approves pardons and sentence reductions for 3,000 to 4,000 prisoners each year at this time. However, this year he announced a general amnesty covering “tens of thousands” of prisoners, including many of those arrested for protesting.
As of press deadline, a more precise number had not been released. The regime said no one arrested for murder, arson, espionage or attacking public buildings would qualify. More importantly, however, it said to qualify protesters would have to show contrition.
Sadeq Rahimi, deputy chairman of the Judiciary, said February 5, “People who have been arrested or are under investigation may say they are not sorry or refuse to give a written pledge. Naturally, they are not subject to the amnesty.”
An estimated 20,000 have been arrested since September. It isn’t known how many have been charged with crimes that will disqualify them from the amnesty.
At least 107 protesters have been sentenced to death or face charges that carry the death penalty. The regime executed two protesters in December and two on January 7, but has executed no protesters since then.
These concessions do not extend to the policy that sparked the uprising—the regime’s demand that women cover their hair outside the home. It is believed that many within the establishment are prepared to abandon that policy. But Supreme Leader Ali Khamenehi has made clear he is not prepared to do so. The establishment has fallen in line behind him and largely remained silent on hejab. But Health Minister Bahram Eyenollahi has bowed down and genuflected to Khamenehi. Eyenollahi announced that he would close medical clinics unless they fully complied with the dress code by making all nurses wear head coverings and by denying service to all those who arrive uncovered.
A great deal of attention was given to the interruption of the televised speech of President Raisi to the huge crowd marking the anniversary of the revolution at Azadi Square February 11. But the interruption only lasted 19 seconds and only impacted the channel known as Telewebion, the internet broadcast channel used by state broadcasting. It did not impact the main over-the-air channels of state broadcasting. The hacker was Edalat Ali (Ali’s Justice) a group that has periodically hacked into state broadcasts in the past.
Raisi’s speech was a heavily anti-American screed that went beyond the rhetoric usually used by past presidents. “You, the enemies of the Islamic revolution, have turned women into a tool for increasing profits and capital,” he said, addressing the United States. “In the matter of family, you want to set an index for human civilization and you introduce one of the ugliest moral movements as an index of civilization. By doing this, you are exterminating the human race and moving against the family and disrupting the institution of the family.” [Translation provided by the president’s office.]
To many, Raisi’s reliance on old rhetoric and his continued resort to confrontation tactics with the West simply provided further evidence that the regime in general and Raisi in particular are out of touch with the new reality in Iran.
Raisi has made clear that he believes an increased effort to propagate regime ideology will solve all problems. He has called for an “explanation jihad” or indoctrination program to counter anti-regime sentiment.
Internationally, the opposition to the regime is continuing to grow stronger and louder. The loudest call was the 99 percent vote in the European Parliament to cite the Pasdaran as a terrorist organization. But all across Europe and North America, marches condemning the regime are mounted even more often than last fall and more and more groups issue statements supporting the protesters and denouncing the Islamic regime.
The movement in Iran still lacks clear leadership. “Neighborhood youth groups” have been formed in many cities and periodically issue calls for protest rallies. They are comprised of anonymous members. They sometimes come together to issue joint calls. The call for the February 16 protests was signed by 50 groups, the largest number of such sponsors yet. It isn’t known how many of these youth groups are real organizations and how many just one or two people.
Internationally, there is a clear desire to have a unified front to support the protests and to lean on Western governments to take more action. This moved into higher gear in January with calls on social media for Prince Reza Pahlavi to take on the key leadership role. But Reza remains reluctant to get too far out in front and has held back.
On February 10, however, he agreed to be part of an eight-person group assembled to try to give some substance to an organization. It did not produce an organization. The result was a series of speeches and encouragement to the opposition inside Iran, but no real organization.
The eight met at George-town University in Washington, DC. Price Reza was joined there by hejab activist Masih Alinejad, actress Nazanin Boniadi and Hamed Esmaeilion, the Iranian-Canadian who leads the families of the victims of the Pasdar shootdown of a Ukrainian passenger jet three years ago. Joining them by video were Nobel laureate Shirin Ebadi, actress Golshifteh Farahani and Abdullah Mohtadi, secretary general of the Komala Iranian Kurdish party. Soccer legend Ali Karimi also sent a message read at the gathering.
They said they are working on a charter for a group they hope will represent the aspirations of the Iranian public and also lobby on a global level for actions to further isolate the Islamic Republic.
The military has devoted most of its speeches to attacking foreign countries for promoting “riots” in Iran in an effort to weaken the government. The chairman of the Joint Staff, Maj. Gen. Hossain Baqeri, said January 9 that this effort was a complete failure and that no more than 0.3 percent of the population had been drawn into the streets. Given a population of 85 million, that would mean 255,000 people.
by Warren L. Nelson
