It seems they are less interested in being billed as Iran’s closest friends when that might make them the target of an Israeli attack.
There is considerable speculation inside Israel that a strike on Iranian nuclear sites could provoke Hamas and Hezbollah to strike Israel on behalf of Iran. The Israeli military intelligence chief has estimated that the two groups have as many as 200,000 rockets, and warned that they may unleash a barrage that could strike all parts of the country.
Some parts of the Israeli press have reported that the majority of Prime Minister Bin-yamin Netanyahu’s security cabinet—eight of the 14 members—is now in favor of a preemptive strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities, although the security cabinet has yet to take up the issue.
On his end, Netanyahu has sought to highlight Iran’s connection with regional groups that have been involved in rocket attacks on Israeli soil.
“What’s happening in Gaza is Iran. Where do the missiles come from? Iran. Where does the money come from? Iran. Who trains the terrorists? Iran. Who builds the infrastructure? Iran. And, often, who gives the orders? Iran,” he recently said.
Netanyahu was speaking about the Gaza-based Hamas, which receives significant financial support from Iran and, despite sporadic low-intensity violence, is largely adhering to a ceasefire with Israel.
Among smaller groups in Gaza that do not adhere to the ceasefire is the Popular Resistance Committees, which, according to the Israeli Defense Ministry launched 310 rockets in early March in retaliation for the assassination of its leader.
But Hamas itself is seeking to publicly distance itself from Iran, insisting that it would not take up the Islamic Republic’s cause even if it were attacked by Israel. “Iran does not need Hamas to respond to Israel in the event of an attack, because it has enormous military capabilities at its disposal, which allow it to act without us,” said Ahmed Yussef, an advisor to Hamas Foreign Ministry in March.
“That’s why Hamas will not be drawn into any war between Iran and Israel,” he said.
Yussef also said Hamas “does not belong to any military or regional political axis, and our activity is in Palestine.”
The group has also sought to downplay its military capabilities in a bid to allay Israeli fears.
“Hamas weapons and the weapons of the Palestinian resistance, in general, are humble weapons that aim to defend and not to attack, and they are to defend the Palestinian people,” Hamas spokesman Fawzi Barhoum told the Associated Press in March. “This does not give us the ability to be part of any regional war.”
Hamas’s lukewarm stance vis-‡-vis Iran appears to be part of a larger recalibration of its strategic stance in the region, which is seeing a resurgence of Sunni movements and Islamist parties – including Hamas’s parent organization, the Muslim Brotherhood.
Iran has asked Hamas’s leadership to publicly side with Syria’s embattled leader, Bashar al-Assad, but Hamas has not obliged. Instead, it has closed down its office in Damascus and its top leaders have sought refuge in other countries in the region. Its leaders have struck a pan-Arab tone in their statements and have sought to improve relations with Arab countries.
“Hamas cannot close its eyes to the bloodshed like that taking place in Syria. It is Arab blood,” said Salah al-Bardaweel, a senior Hamas leader.
In February, Hamas leader Khalid Meshal agreed to a Qatari demand to name Fatah leader Mahmoud Abbas as the prime minister of a Palestinian unity government. Qatar’s monetary support to Hamas has been increasing as Iran has reportedly been cutting back its contributions to Hamas.
However, Hamas has not declared any intention of reversing its ties with the Islamic Republic. Hamas Foreign Minister Mahmoud Zahar even visited Tehran last month.
Some Hamas leaders believe the Arab Spring will empower a moderate form of political lslam that will seek international legitimacy and support, thus not adopting confrontational postures against Israel or the West. If so, Hamas wants to be part of the dominant trend and not be seen as an outsider.
So, for now, the group is aiming to balance its ties with Iran and siding with the populist strain of politics that has been ushered in by the Arab Spring.
Another Iranian ally, Hezb-ollah, also has to reckon with the possibility of being dragged into a war between Israel and Iran. The Shiite group is more closely aligned with Iran than any other group in the region.
How would Hezbollah respond to such a scenario? David Schenker of the DC-based think tank Washington Institute for Near East Policy has identified two options, stressing that it is hard to tell at this point which one the group will ultimately adopt.
“Hezbollah’s response to military action against Iran could be shaped by rational cost-benefit analysis, a perceived spiritual obligation to defend its Shiite patron, or both,” he wrote in a recent policy paper.
Schenker points to a Hezbollah-aligned Lebanese daily, As-Safir, which ran an article saying the real question is not what Iran might ask the group to do, rather the question is the group’s “duty” as the “resistance [to Israel] in this battle.”
Hezbollah’s considerations extend beyond the realm of spiritual duty, however. Schenker points out that the group has made “a series of miscues” that has undermined the group’s carefully crafted image as the defender of Lebanon and the leader of the regional resistance against Israel. These missteps include the armed takeover of Beirut in 2008, Hezbollah’s implication in the 2005 murder of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and Hezbollah leaders’ “impassioned apologia” in support of Assad.
Siding with Shiite Iran in a war with Israel could irreparably damage the group’s long-term prospects, especially given that Israel might implement its “Dahiya Doctrine,” which seeks to deter Hezbollah by threatening to attack civilian infrastructure inside Lebanon if Hezbollah should make war on Israel.
Publicly, Hezbollah leaders have exhibited a more diplomatic stance verging on noncommital.
“There is speculation about what would happen if Israel bombed Iran’s nuclear sites,” Hezbollah chief Hassan Nas-rollah said in February. “I can tell you that the Iranian leadership will not ask Hezbollah to do anything. On that day, we will sit, think and decide what we will do.”