to support the embattled government of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, according to diplomats quoted by Reuters.
The State Department last week said Hamas last year got the “majority” of its funding, weapons and training from Iran. So any substantial reduction, let alone a complete shutoff, could be devastating for the Palestinian group.
Reuters said one diplomat told it that intelligence reports said Iran had reduced its aid to Hamas, while other diplomats said Iran had made no payment to Hamas over the last two months.
In a sign of a cash crunch, the Gaza government, run by Hamas, failed to pay full salaries to its 40,000 civil servants and security troops in either July or August.
Reuters did not identify the diplomats it cited as its sources. The Reuters story was filed from its office in Gaza.
Last year, Hamas said its budget for running Gaza was $540 million with local taxes accounting for only $55 million or barely 10 percent of the total.
The diplomats said Iran was slashing aid for Hamas because Hamas refused to hold rallies backing Assad at Palestinian refugee camps inside Syria—this despite the fact that the headquarters of Hamas has long been in Damascus.
The failure of even Hamas to support Assad shows not only how isolated he is, but how isolated Iran is becoming from the Arab world.
Beyond Iran and local taxes, Hamas is believed to have received major funding from the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. But the diplomats suggested the Brotherhood might also have reduced aid to Hamas so that it can support its own growing political activity in Egypt and provide aid for other revolts around the Arab world.
The Islamic Republic appears also to be suffering strains with Turkey over Syria. The Turkish government has been very active in urging Assad to leave office, much to Tehran’s irritation.
Among the conspiracy-minded in Iran, there is a common belief that the United States and Europe have assigned Turkey the task of handling Syria and leveraging Assad out of the country. That is based on nothing more than the fact that many ideologues in Tehran cannot believe that Turkish officials could make a decision on their own that would be contrary to Iran’s desires.
Turkish-Iranian relations improved dramatically in 2010, largely in Turkey’s self-interest, but if Iran is now viewed in Ankara as fighting too hard for Assad against the rest of the world, it may well limit Turkey’s desire to be politically close to be Iran. Still, Turkey will continue to have an interest in close economic ties with Iran, so the relationship is unlikely to unravel.
