November 19, 2021
by Warren L. Nelson
The Islamic Republic seems to have had second thoughts about its war of words with Azerbaijan and has suddenly called it to a halt.
The verbal contretemps was the first shouting match launched with a neighbor since the Raisi Administration took office in August. But it made no sense to begin with—and the regime seems to have decided that now.
Foreign Minister Hossain Amir-Abdollahian got on the phone with his Azerbaijani counterpart October 13, and the two men agreed to talk over their disagreements. Iran then stopped throwing brickbats at Azerbaijan.
The battle of words began in late September when Azerbaijan arrested two Iranian truck drivers for delivering goods to Nagorno-Karabagh, the Armenian ethnic enclave inside Azer-baijan. The Azerbaijanis also began charging truck drivers large fees. The trucks were using a highway that runs along the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan for about 21 kilometers weaving back and forth across the border.
That made no difference when both states were part of the Soviet Union, nor for the last three decades when Armenian troops occupied the border region on both sides of the border. But last November, Azerbaijan re-conquered its lost territory and now has troops sitting right on parts of the highway.
But Iran didn’t stop at complaining about trouble on the highway. It starting implying that Israeli troops were stationed in Azerbaijan. Israel is believed to have some troops there servicing weapons that Israel has sold to Azerbaijan. But it is not believed that Israel has any combat units inside Azerbaijan—or would even want to have combat troops there.
The Islamic Republic is assumed to have created the issue over Israeli troops because Iranian citizens who are Azerbaijani ethnics would be furious over Iran picking a battle with Azerbaijan, but wouldn’t be so concerned if the arguments were over Israel.
Still, many in Iran believe Israel is intent on promoting the desire of Iranian Azerbaijanis to link up with their brethren in the Republic of Azerbaijan. That is almost certainly true. But it is not done with Israeli troops in Azerbaijan.
(N.B. While Iran has complained bitterly about Azerbaijan’s close relations with Israel, it has remained silent about Armenia’s equally close relations with Israel.)
The Islamic Republic also began complaining loudly that Azerbaijan was planning to “change the border” by creating a land link between the main part of Azerbaijan and its exclave of Nakhichevan along what is now the Armenia-Iran border. It complained loudly and repeatedly that Iran would not tolerate Azerbaijan cutting Iran off from any land connection with Armenia.
To many outsiders, this approached lunacy, since there was never any proposal or suggestion that Azerbaijan would have sovereignty over a highway going to Nakhichevan.
The peace agreement signed last November between Armenia and Nakhichevan provides for a highway that would give Azerbaijan access to Nakhichevan and that Russian troops would police the highway.
Such non-sovereign highway links are found elsewhere. Perhaps best-known is the highway from West Germany to Berlin that US, British and French troops used for four decades to cross East Germany and reach and supply Berlin. There was also a railway link and three air corridors that operated with no restrictions on East German sovereignty.
It was a mystery why the Islamic Republic set off such a frenzy over a non-issue. Some Iranians even went so far as to accuse the Republic of Armenia of being part of a plot to cut its own links with Iran its main ground link to the outside world.
But for the last few weeks, Tehran has been mute about the border issues and about the supposed Israeli threat. As for the highway that Iranian trucks ply, Azerbaijan freed the two drivers it had detained 40 days earlier. And Iran says it will quickly pave another highway parallel to the border with Azerbaijan but well inside Armenia and far from Azerbaijani troops. Many, however, doubt that Iran can make this curvy mountain road usable for trucks in just a few weeks, as it claims it will.
Azerbaijan says Iranian trucks must cease making deliveries to Nagorno-Karabagh, something they have been doing for three decades. Iran had been silent on this issue. The trucks use what is called the Lachin Corridor, a short highway that links Armenia to Nagorno-Karabagh through Azerbaijani territory and is policed by Russian troops. (See reference above to the corridor across East Germany.)
Cynics expect Iran to agree to the ban and to get Armenian license plates from Armenia before making the trip along the Lachin Corridor.
Trend, an Azerbaijani news service, says Iran’s Transportation Ministry has issued an order telling Iranian drivers they must not use the Lachin Corridor or deliver goods to Nagorno-Karabagh.
Unspoken is the underlying conflict between Iran and Turkey. Turkey helped to arm Azerbaijan and make possible its military victory over Armenia last fall. Turkey is clearly now the most influential foreign power in Azerbaijan; Iran, which never had a major influential role, now effectively has no influence in Azerbaijan whatsoever.
Many analysts believe Turkey is using Azerbaijan as part of a much greater effort to shaft Iran and minimize its influence in the entire region. Iran and Turkey are also at daggers’ point over their roles in Syria. Each has troops in Syria and each sees the other as a competitor for influence in that country.
As Emil Avdaliani wrote in Eurasia Review in October, “It is not Israel’s presence that caused the Islamic Republic to escalate its response, but Turkey’s re-emergence as a major power in the South Caucasus and the need to correct Iran’s declining status in the region.”
Adding yet more to the Islamic Republic’s discomfort, a few months ago, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan resolved their decades-old feud over the Caspian and its oil and gas fields. This may revive the long-touted Trans-Caspian Pipeline (something Iran thought it had spiked years ago) allowing Turkmeni gas to be sent to Europe and killing all remaining Iranian hopes of making Europe a market for Iranian gas.
