January 22, 2021
The next presidential election is just six months away. Only one man has so far announced his candidacy while the rightwing Majlis has managed to make it illegal for the man it considers the biggest threat from the Reformists to even run.
But nothing has been heard from the three figures considered the most likely candidates from the right—former Majlis Speaker Ali Larijani, current Majlis Speaker Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf, and the chairman of the Judiciary, Ebrahim Raisi, who ran the last time and lost to President Rohani.
The Reformist and moderate camp is not expected to have much of a chance this election, as they haven’t accomplished much under President Rohani, whose efforts have been foiled by rightwingers, with failures blamed on him, not the rightwingers.
The one candidate from the left of center who seemed to have any public following was Mohammad-Javad Azari-Jahromi, who is the current minister of telecommunications and has a youthful appeal at the age of 38. But the Majlis enacted a law a few months ago that requires a candidate for president to be at least 40 years old.
The one candidate to toss his hat in the ring so far is Hossain Dehqan, who was defense minister during Rohani’s first term. He says he is running as an independent, not aligned with either the Reformist or Principleist movements. He is a retired Pasdar general who served in the air arm of the Pasdaran. He served as commander of he Pasdar forces in Lebanon and Syria in 1983, when the US Marine Barracks and French embassy in Beirut were bombed. He was deputy defense minister under President Mohammad Khatami.
The next election is scheduled for June 18, 2021. President Rohani is barred from running by the constitutional provision barring a president from running for a third consecutive term, though ex-presidents can run again after being out of office for one term.
Other possible contenders have taken themselves out of the race. Oil Minister Bijan Namdar-Zanganeh has said he will retire when Rohani leaves office and will not only not run for president but will not serve in government anymore. Mohsen Hashemi, chairman of the Tehran City Council and son of the late President Rafsanjani, has also bowed out, as have Foreign Minister Mohammad-Javad Zarif and First Vice President Es’haq Jahangiri.
The unannounced candidate who probably should be considered the front-runner is Ebrahim Raisi, the chairman of the Judiciary. But being recognized as the front-runner may be the kiss of death. The front-runners the last three times the incumbent has not been running have all been losers—in 1997, Ali-Akbar Nateq-Nuri lost to Mohammad Khatami; in 2005, Ali-Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani lost to Mahmud Ahmadi-nejad; and in 2013, Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf was defeated by Hassan Rohani.
The other point to be noted in these outcomes is that in each instance the winner effectively repudiated his predecessor—the public in each case chose change. That suggests—and most analysts agree—that a Rohani supporter stands little chance in the next election.
Raisi certainly repudiates Rohani. Raisi has spent the past year speaking on matters that are outside his role as Judiciary chairman and generally taking positions contrary to Rohani’s, setting himself up as a figure advocating change. But change in the Islamic Republic essentially means a change in the personality in the presidency rather than a change in policy, as the Supreme Leader remains in office and determines most lines of policy.
Raisi, 60, is a conservative but has no policy serving as a banner (as Ahmadi-nejad did with his call for direct welfare payments and Rohani did with his call for talks with the world over Iran’s nuclear program). Raisi is a vocal supporter of gender segregation and has loudly supported the Islamization of universities. During the protests of December 2019, Raisi declared that “the full extent of the law will be harshly applied, including execution.”
Raisi supports development of the agricultural sector and objects that the retail sector “will eventually benefit foreign brands.”
In the 2017 election campaign, he promised to triple the monthly welfare payments made to every citizen. He also said he would tackle corruption. Since taking over the Judiciary in 2019, he has made corruption a major issue and can be expected to campaign heavily on that.
Majlis Speaker Qalibaf, 59, is widely expected to run for president as well. He also sought the presidency in 2005, 2013 and 2017, so his candidacy is widely expected. He came in fourth in 2005, second int 2013. In 2017, he withdrew in favor of Raisi in hopes that a united right would topple Rohani.
Qalibaf is generally viewed as much less ideological than most politicians on the right. He offers himself as more of an efficient manager than as an ideologue. He is not helped, however, by the widescale corruption in the capital while he was mayor from 2005 to 2017
Qalibaf took over the speakership this year after conservatives re-took power in the Majlis and Ali Larijani retired.
Larijani is widely believed to be preparing to run for president, leaving political circles in a heated debate on whether the longest-serving Majlis speaker can win bi-partisan backing from rival camps. Larijani started in politics as a staunch rightwinger but progressively moved to the center. For the last four years, he has worked closely with Rohani, to the decided irritation of many of his former stalwart supporters.
Many analysts say he stands little chance of winning the presidency as his political shift has lost him far more support on the right than he has picked up on the left.
The 63-year-old politician is currently serving as a senior adviser to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenehi while holding a seat on the Expediency Council after he bid farewell to the parliament speakership, a post he held for 12 consecutive years.
Last November, Larijani dismissed speculation that his decision not to run again for parliament was an indication that he was planning to fulfill his long-standing ambition for the presidency. But even back then, there were serious doubts that Larijani meant what he announced. “He might not confirm it openly, but he does not rule it out either,” said former deputy Majlis speaker Ali Motahari, who is also Larijani’s brother-in-law.
The more hardcore groups of the Reformist camp say that despite their endorsement of Larijani in the 2016 parliamentary elections, he is still not a welcome member in the circle. “Since when was Larijani a Reformist so that now we could think of endorsing him? This simplistic optimism by some members of the [Reformist] camp is insensible,” said Mohammad-Sadeq Javadi-Hesar of the pro-Reform National Trust Party.
Meanwhile, the Reformists are deliberating whether they should repeat the Rohani experience—that is, “hire a candidate” who is not a genuine Reformist but could help them breathe in the future political atmosphere.
There are loud voices in the camp in open opposition against the plan, however. “By resorting to a hired candidate, the camp will be digging its own grave,” said Reformist political figure Esfandyar Abdollahi. And in an interview with the pro-Reform daily Aftab-e Yazd, former lawmaker Jalal Jalalizadeh even regretted the camp’s support for Rohani, “whose performance dealt the most severe blow to the camp’s credibility.”
The same pattern is holding with greater vigor on the other end of the spectrum, where the hardline Paydari movement considers Larijani a “traitor” and a “dictator.” Yet, when it comes to the more moderate sections on both sides, namely pro-Rohani groups and some traditional conservatives, Larijani is by and large seen as the right choice.
Iran’s latest election — held last February — was a race for parliament that recorded the lowest voter turnout since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. The apathy was largely interpreted as the public’s reaction to deep economic grievances, the state’s harsh clampdown on the November fuel price protests and partly on the merciless purge of Reformist candidates at the hands of the Guardian Council, which prompted many Reformists to stay home on Election Day.
Now, to avoid being sidelined, some Reformists are already mulling a dramatic shift—endorsing Larijani for president on the condition he appoints current Foreign Minister Mohammad-Javad Zarif as his first vice president before the election.
That way, they argue, Larijani could capitalize on Zarif’s popularity, neutralize the hardliners and set the stage for an administration that would pursue closer engagement with the outside world at a critical juncture for the Islamic Republic.
The Executives of Construction Party, one of the Reformist parties and the one that was created to back the policies of President Rafsanjani, has publicly said it is looking at around 20 possible candidates, including Larijani, former Vice President Shahindokht Molaverdi, who was subsequently sentenced to 10 years in prison, Masumeh Ebtekar, best known as the fluent English-speaking spokeswoman for the students who seized the US embassy in 1979, Hassan Khomeini, the grandson of the founder of the Islamic Republic, and Ali Motahari, an outspoken and widely respected former Majlis deputy whose views range from the far right to far left.
A recent poll (see accompanying story) shows former President Mahmud Ahmadi-nejad to be a very popular candidate for president. But the Council of Guardians did not allow him to run four years ago and few think it likely it would allow him to run this time.
Under the Iranian system, anyone can register to be a candidate. The Council of Guardians then decides who will be allowed on the ballot. Many hundreds normally register. Excluding the first presidential election, the Council has allowed anywhere from two candidates (in 1989) to 10 (in 2001).
This year, the 12 Guardians look likely to exercise even more power than in the past. The Majlis approved a bill January 10 that allows the Guardians to review candidates’ political goals and strike a candidate from the ballot if they don’t like his policies. The approved bill allows the Guardians to ask candidates to outline their plans three weeks before the election.
