James Clapper, the director of national intelligence, presented his annual “Worldwide Threat Assessment” last Thursday to the House Intelligence Committee.
Clapper’s report is the combined judgment of all 16 US intelligence agencies.
Clapper summed up the domestic scene in Iran this way: “The Iranian regime has stymied opposition activities and should be able to contain new threats from the opposition to its hold on power over the near term. In reasserting control in the wake of the election, the regime has moved Iran in a more authoritarian direction.”
On terrorism in general, Clapper tried to communicate that Islam is not any threat to the West. He said the Al-Qaeda ideology of violent confrontation appeals only to “a small but active set of Sunni extremists.”
On Iran’s nuclear program, Clapper said Iran was not building a nuclear weapon, but was trying to master all the technology required so it could build a bomb in the future if it chose to do. He said Iran will be able to build a bomb at some point, but he declined to get involved in the dating game of saying how many years away Iran was from that capability.
Contrary to almost all other analyses, Clapper emphasized, “The central issue is [Iran’s] political will to do so [build a bomb].” More commonly analysts debate when Iran will have a bomb in its hands, while Clapper emphasized that the first question is whether it will decide to go ahead and build a bomb.
Clapper’s analysis was far more nuanced than most of the analyses seen in the public media.
A key point of Clapper’s message was that the US intelligence community judges that the Islamic Republic makes rational judgments on nuclear issues. He indicated the community believes Iran will not build a bomb if it becomes convinced that would be detrimental to the regime’s interests.
Clapper said: “We continue to assess Iran is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons in part by developing various nuclear capabilities that better position it to produce such weapons, should it choose to do so. We do not know, however, if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons.…
“Iran’s technical advancement, particularly in uranium enrichment, strengthens our assessment that Iran has the scientific, technical, and industrial capacity to eventually produce nuclear weapons, making the central issue its political will to do so. These advancements contribute to our judgment that Iran is technically capable of producing enough highly enriched uranium for a weapon in the next few years, if it chooses to do so.…
“We continue to judge Iran’s nuclear decision-making is guided by a cost-benefit approach, which offers the international community opportunities to influence Tehran. Iranian leaders undoubtedly consider Iran’s security, prestige and influence, as well as the international political and security environment, when making decisions about its nuclear program,” Clapper testified.
Turning to the domestic scene, Clapper said: “The public protests and elite infighting that followed the June 2009 presidential election posed the greatest internal challenge to the Islamic Republic since the early 1980s.
“The election crisis has widened splits in the country’s political elite and has demonstrated the popular willingness to challenge government authority and legitimacy.
“Nevertheless, the Iranian regime has stymied opposition activities and should be able to contain new threats from the opposition to its hold on power over the near term.
“In reasserting control in the wake of the election, the regime has moved Iran in a more authoritarian direction. Decision-making on domestic issues that affect Supreme Leader Ali Kha-menehi’s hold on power will be shaped by ascendant hardliners, including President Mahmud Ahmadi-nejad and his allies and officials of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps [Pasdaran]. The regime is unlikely to compromise with the opposition.… The regime’s increasing reliance on the Revolutionary Guard to suppress political dissent will allow the Guard to widen its political and economic influence, which has grown over the past two decades.
“Despite the regime’s reassertion of control, it is vulnerable to renewed challenges because traditional conservatives have been alienated and ideological cleavages between conservatives and hardline factions have widened.…
“The election crisis and the most recent round of UN sanctions almost certainly have not altered Iran’s long-term foreign policy goals—namely Iranian sovereignty, and the projection of power and influence in the region and the Muslim world. Iranian leaders probably will continue to issue harsh rhetoric and defy the West, but we judge that the need to avoid tougher sanctions and maintain commercial relationships will likely also temper regime behavior.
“The Intelligence Community judges Tehran will continue to view the United States as an existential threat and as partly responsible for post-election unrest,” Clapper testified