January 10-2014
This is second part of a two-part article.
By Farideh Farhi
The previous administration has imposed heavy economic burdens on the government, including massive commitments for the construction of inexpensive Mehr housing and cash subsidies, both funded mostly through the Central Bank’s cash printing machine with severe inflationary consequences. According to deputy Majles speaker Mohammadreza Bahonar, almost a quarter of Iran’s 40 percent inflation was caused by Ahmadinejad’s nationwide Mehr housing project, quite a bit of which remains unfinished.
Even if some financial assets flow into the country from the relaxation of financial sanctions, the government must still develop policies that balance tough austerity measures to counter inflation with spending that at least keeps some of the unfinished projects going in the hope of preventing worsening unemployment and providing people with some of what they were promised. Last week’s en masse resignations of all MPs from Khuzestan and Kordestan in protest to budget cuts of some of the unfinished development projects in their provinces was symbolic but reflective of the kind of pressures and demands that have been generated from 8 years of expansionary budgets. In the words of Massud Nili, a respected Iranian economist who advises Rouhani, “under these circumstances, how could the government tell people that because I want to bring inflation down I have decided to cut these [housing] loans.” Clearly the issue at hand for the new government is not merely reaching agreement over what medicine needs to be provided to the patient, but also the body politic’s social reaction to that medicine.
Among the general public, there is still neither full confidence in Rouhani’s external interlocutors responding positively to his nuclear gambit, nor full trust in the government’s capabilities. And yet, as Nili points out in an interview with Iran newspaper, the “paradoxical” situation is the demand on and expectation from the government to resolve the problem when it is itself among the “weakest” and “most inefficient” institutions of the country and has become more so in the past few years. In these “emergency” situation circumstances, the wait-and-see attitude toward the new team in the government’s driver seat makes sense. But this situation will not persist forever. No matter what happens with the nuclear talks, economic decisions under whatever circumstances Iranians think are there to stay will replace wait-and-see. Even emergencies have a way of becoming routine and adjusted to after a while. Zarif’s time frame of one year for the resolution of the nuclear conflict was issued for a reason. The country will move out of limbo one way or another even if by limping. The question is: in which direction.
The nuclear Agreement is a preference and not an existential necessity. There are folks in Iran — I would say a minority — who are gleefully betting that there won’t be a final agreement because the United States cannot come to terms with Iran’s bottom lines regarding enrichment and the right to be treated like every other member of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. I also met folks who saw the agreement as a bad deal for Iran. Some genuinely objected to the terms of the agreement and blamed the nuclear negotiators for making mistakes while others from the opposite end of the political spectrum saw this bad deal as a necessity for regime survival. Even though the folks in the latter category dispute the need for Iran’s nuclear program and regard it as a waste of time and resources as well as a dangerous gamble, they regard the support Leader Ali Khamenei has given to nuclear negotiations as a sign of desperation; a drinking from the poison chalice; a submission to an outside power for the sake of his and the regime’s political survival.
Most people I met, however, did not consider a final nuclear agreement as either inevitable or necessary for the survival of the Islamic Republic. They saw it as a preference and as mentioned above, instrumental in shaping the economic and political direction of the country. Reformist friends worried about the impact a failure to reach an agreement will have on tipping the political balance again in favor of those who want a more inwardly oriented Iran that prefers a closed political and cultural environment. Less political folks worried about the continuation of a limping economy unable to address the desires and ambitions of their children.
By presenting a nuclear agreement as a preference, the Rouhani administration has created stakeholders in the pursuit of a “good agreement” and not just any deal. The people I met understood that an agreement that is interpreted as submission domestically will not only worsen Iran’s conflicted domestic politics, it will also ultimately prevent economic re-direction. They understand that a deal which does not address Iran’s bottom lines will not endure and hence are quite pragmatically unwilling to accept just any deal either.
Iran’s more open political environment is solidifying support for the government’s negotiating team and posture. On this issue I relied on my journalist and civil rights activist friends who unanimously announced good riddance to the “dark years,” particularly since the 2009 election. This does not mean that there is an end to harassments, arrests, newspaper bans, or awful things like excessive executions. It simply means that a more open political environment that had all but vanished since 2009 now exists alongside all this again.
I called a prominent reformist upon my arrival. He laughed and asked me whether I thought I was visiting Switzerland since I was using his home phone line. Then he invited me to come over for a visit. Khayan’s Hossein Shariatmadari still refers to former President Mohammad Khatami as the ring-leader of “sedition.” But gone for now are the days when Khatami’s picture and words could not be on any newspapers or magazine. All in all, I found the conversation regarding the state of the country and even sensitive issues such as the nuclear negotiations or the role of the Revolutionary Guards in the economy or politics as quite frank, yet civil. The shouters — definitely now fewer — remain, but the sincere conversation about the state of the economy or what Iran can or should agree to in the nuclear talks is itself producing a calming effect on the country. It has also been relatively successful in keeping the Iranian citizens I met mostly content with their choice to participate in the presidential election. Many saw themselves as instrumental in bringing about change. Moreover, they seemed pleased with their choice of a gradual road to reform; political polarization now seemed quite dangerous in a region full of countries wrecked by extremism, domestic conflicts and external interventions. “Thank you, but no Syria for Iran” was a common refrain. And the most disdainful epithets were reserved for the names of two men who many in the Iranian public now identify with extremism: Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Bibi Netanyahu!
The call for “moderation” is real and not only coming from the government. The reformist experience during Khatami’s presidency and the 2009 election weighs heavily on everyone’s mind. It’s not only this new administration that wants to avoid past mistakes and laying the path, yet again, for the return of what is openly regarded as the extremism of Ahmadinejad’s second term. Reformists are also cautious and wary of moves that could threaten key stakeholders of the Islamic Republic or be perceived as too hasty or provocative by a population tired of — even bored with — fights at the top.
There is no doubt in my mind that the political calm that currently exists in Iran has been profoundly shaped by the extraordinary events of recent years and the utter failure of major political players from both sides of the spectrum to purge their opponents from the political process. Certain issues continue to weigh heavily on everyone’s mind and conscience, especially the continued detention of key politicians. I cannot even begin to tell you what a conflicted experience it was to join a good number of women activists in giving a raucous welcome to Shahindokht Mollaverdi, the new Vice President for Women and Family Affairs, during a ceremony held in the presidential building on Pasteur Street.
These activists from across the political spectrum were very pleased with the appointment of Mollaverdi, an impressive lawyer and formidable promoter of women’s rights, and showed their joy loudly, completely ignoring Islamic decorum by whistling and shouting. The loudness inside the building, however, was a stark contrast to the silence everyone exhibited as we passed Mir Hossein Mousavi and Zahra Rahnavard’s home down the road across from the presidential building. Even the location of this home, enclosed by ugly aluminum barriers, is reflective of the imposing and expectant patience that characterizes the mood of Iran. Rouhani and his team have so far exceeded expectations and proven adept in their respect of this mood at least rhetorically. That mere respect has earned them kudos, but their heavy burdens linger.
Farideh Farhi is an Independent Scholar and Affiliate Graduate Faculty at the University of Hawai’i at Manoa.