February 21, 2025
The new agreement is really just an update of a similar agreement signed in 2001. Both agreements are more like checklists of what they might engage in, rather than substantive, actionable projects. The Islamic Republic likes such framework agreements since they can be touted as important, although they actually commit the regime to next-to nothing.
The only provision worthy of note says, “In the event that either Contracting Party is subject to aggression, the other Contracting Party shall not provide any military or other assistance to the aggressor, which would contribute to the continued aggression.” In other words, this is not a mutual security agreement in which the parties pledge to join in war as an ally if the other party is attacked. Russia has mutual security agreements with North Korea and Belarus, but not with Iran.
In plain language, this means Russia is not offering Iran any help if the United States at tacks it. This limp provision was also contained in the previous 2001 Iran-Russia agreement. The text of the agreement appears to have been drafted primarily by Iran, since the dates used in it are Persian calendar dates with the equivalent Gregorian calendar dates inserted afterward in parentheses, viz.
“Underlining the Treaty between Persia and the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic dated 7 Esfand 1299 of Solar Hijri (corresponding to 26 February 1921) ….” A few of the 47 articles are almost laughable, such as Article 7 which states: “The Contracting Parties shall cooperate … in combating … hostage taking.”
And Article 28 says the two countries pledge to work on the “Promotion of a healthy lifestyle.” Article 19 says: “The Contracting Parties shall guarantee the non-application of unilateral coercive measures aimed directly or indirectly against the other Contracting Party.” In other words, neither Russia nor Iran will adhere to American sanctions against the other, which neither is doing anyhow.
EU Today reviewed the text that was released and said the agreement “serves more as a symbolic gesture of alignment than as a robust alliance with far reaching obligations.” EU Today concluded: “The Russia-Iran strategic partnership, though touted as a significant step, reveals more about the constraints facing both nations than their shared aspirations. Without mutual defense commitments, the agreement signals a relationship of convenience rather than a durable alliance.
Divergent interests—Tehran’s focus on regional ambitions and Moscow’s preoccupation with its war in Ukraine underscore the transactional nature of their cooperation. Ultimately, this partnership reflects a calculated response to shared pressures from the West rather than a cohesive, long-term strategy.”
Ruslan Suleymanov, a Russian analyst of Middle Eastern issues, told The New York Times the new agreement will codify the current relationship between Russia and Iran, but doesn’t represent a new step forward for either.
The vast bulk of the treaty’s provisions are like Article 5, which states: “In order to enhance national security and confront common threats, the intelligence and security agencies of the Contracting Parties shall exchange information and experience and increase the level of their cooperation.”
Determining how to “increase the level of cooperation,” however, will require another, more specific agreement. The treaty is good for 20 years and then will be automatically renewed for additional fiveyear periods, which is the same as saying the treaty is permanent.
The treaty was signed in Moscow January 17 by Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iranian President Masud Pezeshkian. The document says the text was adopted in Persian, Russian and English with the English to be used if any disputes arise