October 10-14
By Natan Sachs As Israel’s prime minister visits the White House, Natan Sachs of the Brookings Institution tells Deutsche Welle (DW) that Benjamin Netanyahu has one thing above all else on his mind.
At the beginning of the week, we heard from Benjamin Netanyahu at the United Nations that the world should not be “bamboozled” by Iran over its nuclear program. Now he’s bringing that message to Washington. Do you think he’s going to get a receptive audience at the White House?
Natan Sachs: The rhetoric is mostly, I think, for public consumption. The president has heard this from the prime minister many, many times, and the United States and Israel are in very close contact on this. But still, Iran is the number one issue on the Israeli mind—certainly on Netanyahu’s mind. The joke in Israel goes that he has three objectives: One is Iran, the second is Iran, and the third is Iran. So he’s going to be hounding this issue, in a slightly new context though.
There are barely two months left to go before the next deadline for the nuclear talks expires. What is the expectation in Israel? Do leaders there believe that the talks will fail?
The expectation is that there is not going to be a big deal, but there could always be surprises. The fear in the Israeli mind is that the Americans may go too far toward the Iranians and try to secure a deal before the end. The parties seem to be very distant on issues of enrichment in particular—on how many centrifuges and what type of centrifuges Iran would keep. So the question is: can they reach a deal? Can they, perhaps, extend things, which the Israelis on the one hand might prefer to a bad deal – they certainly would prefer to a bad deal – but are also fearful of this never-ending extension.
The Israelis furthermore are also concerned that the new fight against the “Islamic State” might make the Americans see a common interest with Iran. After all, Iran is also an enemy of the Islamic State. So the Israelis are very clear and very public about this – they’re trying to get assurances from the Americans that this will not change the American posture on Iran. And so far at least, the Americans have been very clear about this – that their issue on Iran is very separate from the question of the Islamic State.
The new context you referred to in the Middle East has emerged very rapidly, with many countries from around the region and the world now joining that battle against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. Where does Israel fit in strategically?
On the one hand, Israel is very concerned about the mayhem around it. There are jihadists in every direction, formerly in the Sinai even, although Egypt has now taken control of that mostly. But Israel finds itself with a lot of angst about these jihadis in every direction. But in another way, Israel is much more secure. Most of the main powers actually have the same alliance of interests with Israel in a sense. Certainly Saudi Arabia and Egypt are very strongly opposed to the Muslim Brotherhood, and therefore to its branch Hamas, but also to the Islamic State and to Iran. So Israel finds itself in a strange alliance with old adversaries.
As for the fight with the Islamic State, Israel is certainly cooperating with the US; it always does on intelligence and other issues. But it’s staying out of the fray. It knows very well that in these kinds of coalitions, if Israel were to overtly participate, it would only weaken the coalition.
Picking up on what you said about a commonality of interests between Israel and some Arab states – it’s something Netanyahu highlighted in his UN speech. The Palestinians see that as cynical. What’s your view?
I think both sides are right to some degree. There really is a commonality of interests. And in private, the Egyptians and the Saudis have a very strong commonality with Israel in their opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood. Egypt borders Gaza, and during the war in Gaza it wasn’t quite cheering Israel along, but it was close to it. The Egyptian press was very unsympathetic to the Hamas cause, surprisingly so. The same true, to a certain degree, in Saudi Arabia. So there is a real commonality. On Iran, it’s even more so. Not so much with Egypt but with Saudi Arabia. The Saudis see Iran as their main adversary. That’s much more important to them than the Palestinian issue.
But all that has to be bracketed. Public opinion has no two opinions about this. It is completely behind the Palestinians. And it is extremely important to Arabs and to Muslims and to others around the world. And in this regard, whatever the Saudis or the Egyptians think, there’s always a limit to what they can do with Israel because their publics will not accept something public, something that is overarching with Israel unless the Palestinian issue is resolved.
The relationship between Barack Obama and Benjamin Netanyahu is notoriously bad. Also, John Kerry, the Secretary of State, failed in his latest push for peace between Israel and the Palestinians. Can the world expect the US-Israeli partnership to yield anything really constructive in the coming months or years?
The relationship between the president and the prime minister is of course not very good on a personal level, but they have found a way of working on most of the issues. Certainly on security and intelligence. There have been serious frictions, especially in the recent past, around Gaza and other issues. But the relationship is very close, and it runs all the way down the administration.
That said, on the peace process things look very grim at the moment. Not only because of the US-Israeli relationship but because of where both parties are. President Abbas, the Palestinian president, has turned now to the international arena – not seeking direct negotiations with Israel. The Israelis don’t see those negotiations as fruitful and were continuing to build settlements even during those negotiations. So we’re certainly not looking at a very bright future in the next months – perhaps in the next couple of years – in terms of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.
Natan Sachs is a fellow at the Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution in Washington. His work focuses on Israeli foreign policy, domestic politics, the Arab-Israeli conflict and U.S.-Israeli relations.