by Warren L. Nelson
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenehi imposed seven red lines on his nuclear negotiators last week, some of which could be deal-breakers—if Khamenehi sticks by them.
But Khamenehi’s red lines have been distinctly fluid in the past. For example, it was only a few months ago that he said any agreement with the Big Six had to allow Iran to install many more centrifuges than the 19,500 it now has.
But last week’s tentative agreement as announced by the United States allows Iran to have only 6,104 centrifuges installed for the next decade—and Khamenehi has not objected to that at all.
Khamenehi announced his six new redlines last Thursday in his speech responding for the first time to the tentative agreement between Iran and the Big Six.
His seven demands were: 1) that all sanctions be eliminated at the same time, not phased out over time; 2) that they be lifted on the day the agreement starts; 3) that the lifting of sanctions not be linked to any “new procedure;” 4) that no inspectors be allowed on Iranian military bases; 5) that no new means of inspections be used; 6) that research work on nuclear topics continue; and 7) that Iran is assured its allies won’t be harmed by the deal.
On the first red line, Khamenehi said he has told Iran’s negotiators to demand the removal of sanctions all at once. This is a show-stopper. All of the Big Six are understood to be firm that sanctions should be lifted over time as Iran complies with the agreement, though the Russians and Chinese appear willing to lift the sanctions more quickly than the others.
The Russians have publicly said the United Nations sanctions should be lifted at once, but not the EU or US sanctions. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov (the Russian counterpart to American’s Wendy Sherman) said last week: “We confirm our position that the sanctions secured in a UN Security Council resolution should be lifted simultaneously with the agreement’s signing, but that does not mean that the whole range of sanctions will be canceled.”
Second, Khamenehi said, “This issue is very important and the sanctions should be annulled the same day an agreement starts.” In Persian, this sentence was noticeably vague, which may be intended. US Secretary of State John Kerry has said sanctions will start being removed after Iran has completed its key requirements, such as dismantling more than 13,000 centrifuges and taking apart all the plumbing that is used to connect centrifuges into operating cascades.
He said that would probably take Iran four to 12 months.
Some news coverage of Khamenehi’s speech reported he said the sanctions must come off the day the agreement is signed. He did not say that. President Rohani said the sanctions must come off the day the agreement is “implemented,” which agrees with Kerry. Some news stories had Khamenehi saying that. But he didn’t. He used vague terminology that could be translated pretty much any way anyone wants to—which may have been the point. In others words, he ducked the issue of when sanctions should come off.
Third, Khamenehi said, “If the lifting of sanctions is supposed to be linked to a new procedure, the talks will be meaningless in principle because the objective of the negotiations is to get the sanctions lifted.” That, too, is very ambiguous. By “new procedure,” he might be referring to Kerry’s list of what Iran must first do, like dismantling many centrifuges. But Khamenehi avoided specifics and left unclear what this red line is all about.
Fourth, Khamenehi discussed the inspections to be mounted by the International Atomic Energy Organization (IAEA) to look for any violations of the agreement. Khamenehi said the IAEA “should not be allowed to infiltrate the country’s security and defense sector under the pretext of monitoring, and the country’s military officials are by no means allowed to let foreigners into this sector under the pretext of monitoring and inspection, or to halt the country’s development in the defense sector.”
This appeared to be a ban that many generals have insisted on for months, that no inspectors be allowed on Iran’s military bases. This is definitely a show-stopper because it is actually a step backward. IAEA inspectors already visit one Iranian military base because the Fordo enrichment plant is inside a mountain in the interior of a Pasdar base. A ban on visiting any military bases would scuttle the agreement.
Fifth, Khamenehi said, “No unconventional method of inspection that would turn Iran into a specific case in terms of monitoring would be acceptable and the inspections should be within the boundaries of the very same conventional inspections carried out across the world, and nothing more.”
But US officials have said Iran’s negotiators have already agreed on inspections that would go beyond those used by the IAEA in any other country. So, Khamenehi’s red line would appear to role back something Iran has already accepted and be a show-stopper.
Sixth, Khamenehi said, “Scientific and technical development in different aspects should continue. Of course, the negotiating team may deem it necessary to accept some restrictions and we have no opposition in that regard, but technical development should definitely continue and go ahead in full force.”
The United States has already said it has agreed to allow Iran to conduct further research and development work on nuclear programs, so this red line would appear to be no more than rhetoric.
Seventh, Khamenehi said the agreement “must not put pressure on our brothers,” which appeared to mean Hezbollah and Hamas—and may also the Houthis in Yemen. At any rate, the agreement deals only with Iran’s nuclear program so that red line is superfluous. It may have been included as a sop to Hezbollah and Hamas.
