terrorism, but prefers low level actions rather than the mass casualties that Al-Qaeda hungers for.
Daniel Byman, research director at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, part of Brookings, testified recently to the Senate Near East Subcommittee in hearings it held on Iranian support for terrorism.
Byman described a range of reasons for Iran’s attraction to 
terrorism. Unlike most governments, Byman said one major reason is the simple human desire for revenge, something modern nation-states rarely allow to drive policy decisions.
Byman warned that if the Islamic Republic gets nuclear weapons, the danger is not so much that it will use an atomic bomb but rather that it will hide behind the protective curtain of its nuclear weapons to use terrorism even more aggressively.
“Although the Islamic Republic’s motivations have varied over the years, its leaders have consistently viewed ties to and support for a range of terrorist groups as an important instrument of national power,” Byman testified.
“Disturbingly, Iran’s support for terrorism has become more aggressive in recent years, motivated by a mix of fear and opportunism. Iran could become even more aggressive in the years to come, exploiting the perceived protection it would gain if it developed a nuclear weapon [and] … using terrorists to vent its anger and take revenge.
“However, under current circumstances Tehran still remains unlikely to carry out the most extreme forms of terrorism, such as a mass-casualty attack similar to 9/11 or a strike involving a chemical, biological, or nuclear weapon,” Byman said.
”As the United States is already exerting tremendous pressure on Tehran via sanctions and diplomatic isolation because of Iran’s nuclear program, there are few arrows left in America’s quiver and thus the United States will find it hard to place additional pressure on Iran due to terrorism,” he argued.
“Allowing Iran to get the bomb is dangerous in and of itself and may make Tehran more aggressive in supporting terrorists, but a military strike to destroy the program is likely to lead Iran to use terrorism to take revenge.”
Byman then outlined six core reasons that the Islamic Republic is attracted to terrorism.
First, he said is the regime’s goal of undermining and bleeding its rivals. “Iran has regularly used terrorist groups to weaken governments it opposes. This has included bitter enemies like Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and also lesser foes like the rulers of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.
Second, Byman said the regime sees terrorism as a tool for projecting power and playing spoiler in the world. “Tehran has a weak military and only limited economic clout. Its ideological appeal at the height of its revolutionary power was limited, and today it is paltry. Nevertheless, Iran’s regime sees itself as a regional and even a world power, and working with terrorists is a way for Iran to influence events far from its bordersÖ. [Terrorism] gives Iran stature and sway in the broader Middle East.”
Third, he said Iran concludes that terrorism helps give Iran a voice in opposition councils. “For Iran, it was often important not just that an enemy regime lose power or be weakened, but that particular strands within an opposition get stronger. So, in Lebanon, Iran undermined Amal, a Shia militia, because it did not share Iran’s ideology and interests. Tehran helped found Hezbollah to replace it—a risky gamble that paid off but could have easily backfired on Iran.”
Fourth, Byman said the Islamic Republic sees terrorism as deterring its enemies. “By having the ability to work with terrorists and to subvert its enemies, Iran is able to press them to distance themselves from the United States or to refrain from joining economic or military efforts to press Iran. Such efforts, however, often backfire: because these states see Iran as meddling in their domestic affairs and supporting violence there, they often become more, not less, willing to support economic or even military pressure directed at Tehran.”
Fifth, Byman says terrorism enables Iran to preserve its options—that is, by aiding independent terrorist groups, Iran gains the option of sometime urging these groups to carry out specific terrorist acts at Iran’s behest. “As a weak state—one with little ability to coerce via military or economic pressure—in a hostile region, Tehran also seeks to keep its options open. Iranian leaders recognize that in Iraq, Afghanistan and other turbulent countries, those in power today may be on the sidelines tomorrow and vice versa. In addition, they may want cordial relations with a neighbor at present but understand that circumstances may change in the future. So Iran courts and supports a range of violent groups even when it does not seek to exploit their capabilities under current circumstances. These groups can then be employed should Iran want to ratchet up pressure or punish an enemy…. Tehran at times works with the Taliban, with which Iran almost went to war in 1998, because they have mutual enemies and to preserve Iran’s optionsÖ. Iran is less likely to use mines and anti-ship cruise missiles to try to close the Strait of Hormuz, but could instead use terrorist attacks that can be hard to trace directly to Tehran.”
Sixth, the Islamic Republic finds terrorism attractive for the simple delight of revenge, even if other states rarely adopt revenge as a policy. “Although it is always tempting to attribute a strategic motive to all of Iran’s behavior, Iran’s leaders have at times used terrorism simply to take revenge on their opponents. Tehran struck at France and the [Persian] Gulf states in the 1980s, for example, because they supported Baghdad during the Iran-Iraq war. Similarly, some Iranian attacks on Israeli targets may in part be spurred by Iran’s belief that Israel is behind the killing of Iranian nuclear scientists. Iran’s actions may be as much about revenge as they are about any putative deterrence.”
Continuing on that revenge rationale, Byman said, “The so-called ‘shadow war’ between Israel and Iran … has created a retaliatory dynamic, with Iran feeling compelled to respond to what it sees as Israeli aggression. This sentiment comes from a desire to prove to the Iranian population at large that its government is responding, anger within key elite audiences—particularly the IRGC [Pasdaran]—and a sense of humiliation, and a strong belief in revenge. So as long as Israel and other states use low-level attacks on Iran and maintain a high degree of economic and political pressure, Iran is likely to attempt terrorist attacks as a response.
“If Israel and/or the United States did a direct military strike on Iran’s suspected nuclear facilities, the Iranian terrorist response would be considerable. Because Iran supports terrorists in part to keep its options open, now would be the time for Tehran to call in favors. We could expect attempted terrorist attacks around the world.”
Byman also addressed how an Iran with nuclear weapons might re-adjust its resort to terrorism.
“If … Iran does acquire a nuclear weapon, it is difficult to predict how Tehran would behave,” Byman said. “Some scholars have argued the theoretical point that, in general, nuclear weapons make states more cautious as they fear the potentially catastrophic escalation that a nuclear crisis could bring about.
“Thus, Iran, more secure due to the nuclear weapons and more cautious because of the associated risks, would be more restrained in its foreign policy. More likely, though hardly inevitable, is that Tehran might become emboldened by a nuclear weapon.
“Currently, the threat of US conventional retaliation is an important check on Iranian behavior, as Tehran recognizes that its forces are no match for the United States. A nuclear weapon, however, would give Tehran the ability to threaten a devastating response should it be attacked with conventional forces. This ‘umbrella’ would then enable Iran to be more aggressive, supporting substate groups like Hezbollah or opposition forces against various Arab enemies.
“The model here would be Pakistan: after acquiring a nuclear capability, and thus, it believed, a degree of immunity from India’s superior conventional forces, Islamabad became more aggressive supporting various insurgent and terrorist groups in Kashmir and fighting New Delhi in general.”
Byman said there was a “silver lining” in the sense that Iran “is not likely to pass a nuclear weapon to terrorist groups except under the most extreme circumstances.” This fear of Iran arming some terrorist group to attack the United States is very common among both liberals and conservatives in the United States, but Byman disagreed.
“Tehran would not be likely to trust such a sensitive capability to a terrorist group. Too much could go too wrong in too many ways. In addition, even a more emboldened Tehran would recognize that the United States and Israel would see such a transfer as a grave threat and would dramatically escalate their pressure on Iran, perhaps including significant military operations.
“In addition, the United States might be able to gain international support as almost all states, including China and Russia, fear such transfers. Moscow and Beijing have their own terrorism problems. …
“One indication of Iran’s caution on this score is that it has not transferred much less lethal and controversial chemical weapons to Hezbollah, despite having these in its arsenal for over 25 years.”
