September 12-14
In its quarterly report, the IAEA took the unusual step of showing how peeved it was by emphasizing Iran’s non-cooperation in the very first two paragraphs of the report.
The agency continued to phrase its report bureaucratically, but it waved its unhappiness right in front of anyone picking up the report.
The first two paragraphs of the report state:
“Iran has: implemented one of the five practical measures that it agreed with the Agency in May 2014 in the third step of the Framework for Cooperation by the agreed deadline of 25 August 2014; implemented two of the five measures after the deadline; and begun discussions with the Agency on the other two practical measures.
“The Agency requested that Iran propose new practical measures by 2 September 2014 to be implemented by Iran in the next step in relation to the Framework for Cooperation. New practical measures have yet to be proposed.”
The one measure completed on time was allowing the IAEA to visit the lab where Iran conducts its research on centrifuges. The measures completed in the week after the deadline were an IAEA visit to the site where Iran’s centrifuges are assembled, and an agreement on safeguards for the reactor being built at Arak.
But with the deadline already passed, Iran only engaged in discussing the other two issues for the first time on August 31, conveniently just before the IAEA submitted its quarterly report. Those two issues are: providing information on large scale high explosives experiments and on work done by Iran on “neutron transport,” which is related to calculating nuclear explosive yields.
Iran’s ambassador to the IAEA, Reza Najafi, said Friday that Iran was unable to fully implement those two items by the deadline “considering the complexity of he issues.”
PressTV, the English language arm of state broadcasting, then quoted Najafi as stunningly asserting: “The agency has not expressed concern over the issue in its report as it was aware of that beforehand.”
The next day, Behruz Kamalvandi, the spokesman for the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, told the state news agency that Iran had never agreed on any deadline for providing the IAEA with any information.
PressTV, by the way, led its story on the IAEA report by saying the IAEA “has confirmed Iran’s implementation of transparency steps regarding its nuclear energy program,” implying that all the promised measures had been taken.
The IAEA report also made a point of noting that “certain of the activities being undertaken by Iran at some of the facilities are contrary to the relevant resolutions of the [IAEA] Board of Governors and the Security Council.” Also, “Contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran has not suspended work on all heavy water projects.” In addition, “Iran is conducting a number of activities at [four named sites within Iran], which are in contravention of its obligations to suspend enrichment related activities and heavy water related projects.” And, “Contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran is not implementing its Additional Protocol,” which gives the IAEA access to many more sites inside Iran.
The report also complained that Iran has refused for the third time to issue a visa to one of the IAEA staff members the agency wants at meetings with Iran because of his or her technical expertise.
The IAEA has reached agreement with Iran on three steps in addressing its outstanding questions about Iran’s nuclear program. The six “practical measures” in the first step were completed early this year. The second step involved seven practical measures to be completed by May. The agency appears satisfied with what Iran has done on six of them, but its report says the seventh is still open.
This deals with Iran’s work on exploding bridge wire (EBW) detonators, which can be used to detonate a nuclear warhead. Iran says its EBW work was related to oil exploration. The IAEA report indicates the agency is not satisfied with what Iran has provided it to date and is keeping the EBW issue open. The report says it asked Iran for more information last month.
In another matter, Iran last week boasted that it had developed an entirely new and much faster centrifuge that it dubbed the IR-8 centrifuge. It implied that it was ready to use the IR-8 as soon as the nuclear talks are wrapped up. But the agreement with the Big Six prohibits Iran from enriching any uranium in any new centrifuge design, so it cannot test the IR-8. The IAEA report notes that there is one IR-8 casing installed at Natanz, but it does not contain a rotor assembly and therefore cannot be operated. That suggests the IR-8 claim is overblown.
