February 07-2014
By Carl M. Levin and Angus S. King Jr
There are only two ways to keep Iran from developing a nuclear weapon: negotiations or military action.
Amazingly, after 34 years of mostly diplomatic silence between Iran and the United States, we are in the midst of negotiations with the potential to eliminate the threat of a nuclear-armed Iran.
Instead of cautiously welcoming this development and letting these talks play out over the next six months, however, some members of Congress are circulating proposals that seek to impose additional sanctions in the middle of the negotiations. This step, we fear, risks scuttling the process and could have damaging ramifications for the United States as well as our regional allies and partners, especially Israel.
The increasingly stringent economic sanctions that have been imposed on Iran over the last three decades have worked. Iran’s new president, Hassan Rouhani, came to office last year promising an improved economy, and he seems to have quickly realized that the only way to deliver on this promise is by achieving relief from the sanctions. And so, with the approval of its supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran has finally come to the table — reluctantly and grudgingly.
If the sanctions have worked, so the argument goes, won’t additional sanctions work even better? If we just increase the pressure, won’t we get a more favorable outcome? That logic would make sense only if Iran were a politics-free zone where a consensus existed in support of negotiations to end the country’s nuclear program.
But all evidence — from public statements as well as available intelligence — suggests that there is no such consensus. In fact, there are hard-line elements within the Iranian government and military who don’t like the idea of negotiations, are not terribly worried about new sanctions (oligarchs always get what they need anyway), and feel that the nuclear program is a matter of national pride and, perhaps, national survival.
For us to impose additional sanctions under these circumstances (or threaten to impose additional sanctions) could be an “I told you so” moment for these hard-liners, providing the very excuse they’re looking for to kill the negotiations and, with them, what is probably the best chance we have of resolving this incredibly dangerous situation without resorting to military action.
From our vantage point as senators serving on the Armed Services and Intelligence Committees, the risk analysis is quite straightforward.
The potential upside of legislating further sanctions is the hope that increased pressure might elicit more concessions or push Iran to conclude a more favorable deal. But this is unlikely. The potential downside is more likely and more dangerous: Iran’s decision makers could conclude that the United States government was not negotiating in good faith — a view that Iranian hard-liners already espouse. This could prompt Iran to walk away from the negotiations or counter with a new set of unrealistic demands while redoubling its efforts to produce nuclear weapons.
Instead of slowing Iran’s nuclear program, such legislation could actually accelerate its quest for atomic weapons, leaving a stark choice: Either accept the possibility of a nuclear-armed Iran, or use military force to stop it.
Worse still, it could alienate our international partners. The sanctions have been effective largely because of the active participation of many countries, including China and Russia. When the United States alone doesn’t buy Iranian oil, it has little effect on Iran’s economy, but when the European Union stops, and other major oil customers of Iran such as China, Japan, South Korea, India and Turkey significantly reduce their purchases (which they have), Iran is in trouble (which it is).
The countries that have joined America in ratcheting up the economic pressure on Iran all support the interim agreement that went into effect on Jan. 20. Legislation to impose additional sanctions by the United States could be interpreted by our partners as undermining the negotiations. This could have the adverse effect of lessening the international community’s economic pressure on Iran, spooking our partners and diminishing their commitment to the cause.
Finally, under the terms of the interim agreement, the Iranians have six months to prove they are serious about this process. If they fail this test, the United States will surely act immediately to impose additional sanctions, and our international partners, understanding that we have given a negotiated approach a chance to succeed, are likely to join us.
We don’t know whether Iran can be persuaded to peacefully give up its nuclear weapons ambitions — but it is very much in our interest to give this diplomatic process every chance to succeed.
Carl M. Levin, Democrat of Michigan, is chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Angus S. King Jr., an independent senator from Maine, is a member of the Armed Services and Intelligence Committees.
