October-18-2013
by Warren L. Nelson
The Islamic Republic bounced back and forth down a very bumpy road in the week leading up to the start of talks Tuesday with the Big Six over its nuclear program.
The talks kicked off very positively in Geneva Tuesday with all the Big Six delegations apparently pleased with Iran’s presentation, which was seen as positive and a dramatic change from the delaying tactics of recent years. But everyone who would talk agreed that much more detail is needed to flesh out the Iranian proposal before any substantive judgments can be made.
That was not a criticism of the Iranian proposal, just recognition that no major agreement can be wrapped up in two days of meetings and much work remains to be done.
The first change in tone came when Foreign Minister Mohammad-Javad Zarif gave a one-hour PowerPoint presentation of Iran’s proposal in English. The previous negotiator, Saeed Jalili, would only speak in English and his remarks then had to be translated, slowing the process considerably and minimizing give-and-take.
Iran said the PowerPoint presentation was entitled, “Closing an unnecessary crisis, opening new horizons.”
The fact that Zarif made any offer was a surprise given that only a week earlier he had said Iran would make no offer at all and demanded that the Big make the first offer. It appears that all members of the Big Six communicated that this was not acceptable because the Big Six had tabled an offer last February and Iran still had not given them the courtesy of a reply in keeping with diplomatic norms. Zarif swiftly reversed himself without explanation and began boasting about the comprehensive offer he would make.
Zarif also insisted that the Big Six send their foreign ministers to meet with him. They declined. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov publicly and very firmly rebuffed Zarif’s call as diplomatically inappropriate; the others said nothing publicly, but it is the diplomatic norm that foreign ministers come in only when the bulk of the issues have been resolved and a few major points remain outstanding.
Without his counterparts present, Zarif only gave the opening outline Tuesday morning and then retired from the talks, leaving Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi to head the Iranian delegation facing deputy foreign ministers from the each of the Big Six.
But the fact that Zarif made two unprofessional demands—that the other foreign ministers attend and that the Big Six make the first offer—raised questions about Zarif’s competence.
There was also concern about his capacity to withstand pressure from hardliners. Last week, after he met with members of the Majlis National Security Committee, the daily Kayhan reported Zarif had told deputies that the phone call between Presidents Rohani and Obama had been a mistake and his own 30-minute private meeting with US Secretary of State Kerry at the UN probably lasted too long.
He said on his Facebook page Tuesday that after he read the Kayhan article—which he termed false—he was unable to walk or sit and had severe back pain, a long-standing ailment. He said he canceled some of his appointments that day and then checked into a hospital that evening for an MRI, which produced a diagnosis of “stress and muscle spasm.”
That a mere news story caused such physical pain and prompted him to check into a hospital raised questions about his tolerance for stress.
Zarif wrote on Facebook, “It is a source of regret that an hour and a half of serious, earnest and private discussions with lawmakers—which had been clearly agreed to be secret and non-reportable—were summarized in a few sentences [and leaked]…. Those quotes had nothing to do with my comprehensive argument. Its content did not correspond to what I had said.”
He concluded, “I learned that whatever I want to say, to say it publicly, because otherwise the market for abuse is very active.” That suggested to some that Zarif had a very thin skin, which can disable a person in such a position as he holds.
Another sign of the positive change in tone at the talks came when Araqchi agreed to meet privately Tuesday afternoon with his American counterpart, Under Secretary of State Wendy Sherman.
The Americans also gave a positive signal, indicating they were willing to discuss Iran’s main concern—sanctions relief. For the first time, the US delegation included Adam Szubin, the chief of the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), the agency that oversees all sanctions.
The easiest sanctions to modify are those imposed by the US president. But other sanctions have been imposed by the US Congress and the Democratic-majority Senate and Republican-majority House would have to agree on any change. Still others are imposed by the EU, where all 28 foreign ministers must agree to any changes. And others come from the UN Security Council, where any of the five permanent members can veto any proposed change.
The talks progressed under the stern message from US Secretary of State John Kerry that “no deal is better than a bad deal.” Both Washington and Tehran know that any deal will have to be well-crafted because both countries are filled with hostile hardliners who are already sharpening their axes to take out after whatever is agreed upon.
All parties were silent about the contents of the Iranian proposal, in keeping with diplomatic practice. If they had thought the proposal was not serious, the proposal would probably have been leaked quickly to ridicule Iran. But no one did that—at least not yet—suggesting the Big Six delegations are taking the Iranian proposal seriously.
The Iran Times went to press between the first and second day of the talks.
Many Westerners had problems with what Iranian officials said in the days before the talks began.
Araqchi was quoted by the Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) as saying the Islamic Republic was not offering to sign any Additional Protocol to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty allowing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to make unannounced inspections inside Iran.
The Big Six and IAEA consider that essential to verify any agreement. But analysts noted Araqchi did not say Iran would not sign any Additional Protocol, just that no offer to sign it was part of Iran’s proposal. The term “Additional Protocol” leaves a bad taste in the mouths of many in Iran, so it has long been assumed nothing called that would be signed, but something perhaps called a “Special Agreement” that accomplished the same thing has been anticipated to make it more palatable to Iran.
Other officials said Iran would not agree to “suspend” uranium enrichment, as required by a UN resolution dating back to 2006. Analysts have long suggested that Iran might “suspend” enrichment for one week in order to put in place other parts of an eventual agreement and thus fulfill the UN resolution. Contrary to popular belief, the UN resolution does not call for a permanent end to uranium enrichment by Iran.
The United States has pointedly maintained silence on whether it would agree to some level of enrichment by Iran—prompting most analysts to assume Washington will agree to some constrained level.
Araqchi said Iran would not agree to ship its stockpile of enriched uranium out of the country, but it was left unclear—perhaps intentionally—whether he was saying it wouldn’t ship any of its enriched uranium out or that it wouldn’t ship all of its enriched uranium out, a major distinction.
Araqchi told state broadcasting, “We will negotiate about the volume, levels and the methods of enrichment, but shipping out the [enriched] material is a red line for Iran.”
Araqchi spoke just a few days after Majlis Speaker Ali Larijani—a former nuclear negotiator—told The Associated Press Iran has “surplus” of enriched uranium that it could ship out of the country. Analysts wondered if Araqchi’s thumbs-down to such shipments was a rebuff of Western calls for the export of enriched uranium or a rebuff of Larijani for intervening in the issue.
(The Majlis later issued a statement denying that Larijani had said anything about a surplus of enriched uranium. The AP did not change its news report on the interview.)
It has been widely touted that Iran is prepared to offer to end all enrichment to 20 percent if the final agreement has the West providing Iran with the 20 percent fuel needed to run its small reactor in Tehran that provides medical isotopes to hospitals. The Big Six long ago proposed just that.
It is also expected that Iran will propose a limit on the number of centrifuges it will install. Iran currently has about 19,000 centrifuges installed at two enrichment centers, which have a combined capacity of about 57,000 centrifuges.