January 17-2014
Israeli military intelligence is rapidly filling up with Iranian-born immigrants to Israel and the children of such immigrants who are needed for their knowledge of Farsi.
The Israeli daily Haaretz reported last week that Farsi speakers who are drafted are assigned to military intelligence units in disproportionately large numbers, reflecting the military’s high demand for Farsi speakers to monitor the Jewish state’s arch-enemy.
A story in the official Israeli military journal Bamahane included rare personnel data showing that one in five Jewish immigrants from Iran serve in intelligence units due to their native Farsi.
Describing this selection rate as “significantly higher” than the overall average among conscripts from other backgrounds, Bamahane quoted an Iranian immigration organizer as saying Farsi fluency was key.
“Bringing Iranian natives with a command of Farsi into the intelligence corps is a priority,” the organizer, Adi Bublil, said. “They have an advantage, as Farsi is not a common language among young men and women in Israel.”
Israel’s military intelligence corps is well funded and staffed. Its Unit 8200 specializes in electronic eavesdropping like the US National Security Agency (NSA).
The Israeli civilian spy agency, Mossad, is widely assumed to have carried out more aggressive actions like sabotage in Iran and assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists.
According to Bamahane, “dozens” of Iranian-born Jews join the Israeli military each year. Immigration from the Islamic Republic—whose Jewish minority is now believed to number less than 25,000—is conducted discreetly and on a relatively small scale.
Last September, Israel’s top-rated Channel Two TV aired footage of military intelligence soldiers in a Farsi class.
According to that report, Iranian-born troops were included in the language program, which lasts seven months and combines comprehension of technical terms with Farsi songs and Persian folklore designed to improve eavesdroppers’ colloquial skills.
“We need to know everything [about Iran], from combat doctrines to weaponry to operational routines to slang and codes,” said the training academy’s commander, a lieutenant colonel whose name was withheld under regulations.
Israel and Iran have been trying to infiltrate each other with spies, assassins and saboteurs. The website Strategy Page last week said, “Israel has been very successful while Iranian efforts have largely failed.”
Strategy Page said the main reason for this was the large number of Iranian Jews who fled Iran since the revolution and brought their cultural awareness and language skills with them.
On the other hand, there have been very few—if any—Israelis willing to defect to Iran and help spy against Israel.
In addition to their cultural knowledge and language skills, the Iranian Jews brought with them links to Iranian Muslims who were opposed to the religious regime and interested in working against the Iranian government—without necessarily knowing they were working for Israel.
Strategy Page said Iran has been trying to recruit people who can operate inside Israel. The best prospects seem to be Arabs who are Israeli citizens. But Strategy Page says the ones most likely to become Iranian spies are already being watched by Israeli intelligence.
The Pasdaran’s Qods Force, which runs espionage operations abroad, has been trying to break into Israel. Last year, an Iranian expatriate with Belgian citizenship was arrested for trying, at the instigation of the Qods Force, to set up an espionage and sabotage network in Israel. He is awaiting trial.
Strategy Page reported that the arrested man had a brother who worked for Iranian intelligence and helped recruit him.
In 2007, Israel revealed an Iranian effort to recruit Israelis of Iranian origin to spy for Iran. Up until then, Israel had detected at least 10 Iranian attempts to recruit Israelis as spies. This was possible because Iran still allowed Israelis of Iranian origin to return and visit kin in Iran.
Strategy Page said the classic method of recruitment was to threaten kin in Iran with imprisonment, torture or death if the Iranian Jew who was now an Israeli did not supply information. Some of these Israelis reported the Iranian recruiting attempt to the Israeli government and that led to a more vigorous Israeli counterintelligence effort against Iranian attempts at penetration.
Because of this Israeli scrutiny of Iranian-born Jews, Strategy Page says Iran is now going after non-Jewish Iranians who have emigrated to the West and used threats or offers of money to recruit them as intelligence operatives. Iran seeks out expatriate Iranians who have been successful in legitimate international businesses as this allows them to travel a lot without attracting too much attention.
