September 27-2013
By Ray Takeyh
Credibility is a prized word in international politics. Countries that keep their promises and enforce their red lines can be counted on to deter their enemies and assure their allies. Nations, as with human beings, develop reputations, and those that break their pledges are impossible to trust.
As such, the failure of the United States to bomb Syria is bound to empower Iran and reinforce its quest for nuclear arms. The only problem with such assertions is that the historical record suggests that the so-called credibility argument rests on a very thin intellectual rail. America’s enemies put premium on its capabilities rather than indications of its resolve. It is Washington’s allies, however, that are likely to prove sensitive to its intentions as opposed to its actual power. The events of the past few weeks have probably impacted Israel more so than Iran.
The most tragic application of the credibility argument for the United States was the Vietnam War. During Washington’s quarter of century involvement in Southeast Asia, successive administrations never claimed that Vietnam by itself was relevant for U.S. security, but that the failure to stop the advance of communism there was bound to embolden the Soviet Union. America fought in Vietnamese jungles to prove to the Kremlin that once the United States drew its red lines it would use all of its power to achieve its objectives. In one of the ironies of history, the collapse of U.S. efforts in Vietnam was followed a decade and a half later by the demise of the Soviet Union.
The guardians of the theocratic state are clever men accustomed to sensing the subtleties of power. Although cavalier in their public pronouncements and bold in terms of their adventures in the Middle East, Iran’s military men do respect America’s armada assembled on their periphery. They know well that Washington is anxious to avoid a cascade of proliferation in the critical Gulf region. And they know that the United States has the military power to destroy their nuclear infrastructure. It is this calculus more so than America’s reticence in Syria that weighs on the minds of the mullahs.
Given the fact that Iran appreciates U.S. power, how can one account for its nuclear truculence? Just because Tehran recognizes the reality of American strength that does not mean that Iran will readily acquiesce to its mandates. The clerical leaders have their own version of two-track policy to forestall an American attack. On the one hand, they point to their deterrent capability — terrorist allies such as Hezbollah are emphasized and the notion of inflicting damage on America’s military and diplomatic personnel is subtly stressed.
At the same time, Iran has entangled the United States in a prolonged diplomatic process that has successfully deferred a military response. Iran’s diplomatic track has been complemented by a charm offensive emphasizing its readiness to arrive at a mutually satisfactory settlement. It is very hard for Washington to justify a strike on Iran given the probability of retaliation and Tehran’s seeming willingness to resolve the issue at the negotiating table.
While not bombing Syria may not have had a measurable impact on Iran’s calculations, it is likely to condition Israel’s response to the Islamic Republic’s nuclear imbroglio. For Israelis, as with all small powers measuring the reliability of their superpower patron, intentions matter more than capabilities. It is not America’s actual military power but its willingness to use that power that impresses its allies. What Israelis have seen of late is a Washington that, faced with a violation of its red line on the use of weapons of mass destruction, embraces a Russian effort at the United Nations Security Council. There are no two entities with less credibility in Jerusalem on the issue of unconventional weapons than Russia and the United Nations.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his hawkish advisers may yet conclude that any forceful resolution of the Iran crisis requires Israel acting alone. Whatever the probabilities of Israeli bombing Iran’s facilities may have been prior to the Syrian crisis, those numbers have only gone up.
The recent Syrian melodrama indicates how little historical assessments penetrate governmental deliberations. The notion that we have to bomb Damascus to impress Tehran is short-sighted and without much analytical underpinning. There may be ample justification for the use of force against a regime that has used chemical weapons against unarmed citizens. Indeed, the tragedy of the Syrian civil war has long called out for a more determined international effort. However, in assessing the effect of the recent crisis one has to conclude that its impact will be felt more in Israel than in Iran.
Ray Takeyh is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.
