as high as 27 percent, but there is broad consensus among experts that this probably does not involve any conscious cheating and was just a glitch.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said it only found “particles” enriched to 27 percent, not an entire batch of uranium.
While the IAEA did not characterize what it found in any way, outside specialists in West who often suspect the worst of the Islamic Republic were not excited or concerned by the revelation.
The rest of the quarterly report was pretty much like most past reports. It did not find any large jump in the number of centrifuges deployed. There have been from 8,000 to 9,000 centrifuges at Natanz for almost three years straight despite the fact that Natanz is designed to hold 54,000 centrifuges.
The report said all the installed centrifuges are still what Iran calls the IR-1, a design that dates from the 1950s. It said Iran is working on five more advanced designs that can enrich uranium much more quickly, but none seems to be ready for installation. It has been widely assumed that Iran is not building the IR-1 in large numbers because it has been expecting for years that one of the newer and better designs would soon be ready to replace the IR-1.
Iran has long promised it would not exceed 20 percent enrichment, so the particles at 27 percent drew instant attention. The IAEA said it has asked Iran for an explanation.
Two senior officials familiar with the IAEA’s findings told Bloomberg news the 27 percent could be the result of a brief condition that can occur when material is fed into centrifuges.
Experts that Agence France Presse spoke with also said a processing glitch could cause a brief jump in enrichment and was not necessarily a sign of cheating by Iran. Mark Fitzpatrick of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London said, “There are good reasons to worry about Iran’s enrichment work, but this probably isn’t one of them.”
The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) in Washington issued a written analysis that said: “This elevation is likely due to improved cascade design. The cascades [groups of centrifuges] at Fordo making 19.75 percent LEU [low enriched uranium] have 17 stages instead of 15 as in the old cascade design. An effect is to overshoot 20 percent when 3.5 percent LEU is fed into the tandem cascades at the old feed rate for 15-stage cascades…. This development is an embarrassment for Iran but is not a sign of Iran moving to higher enrichment levels.”
But ISIS added a word of caution: “Its deployment of a 17-stage cascade reflects a reconfiguration of the cascades that can make a breakout [to make weapons-grade uranium] faster and more efficient.”
ISIS also made a point of noting that Iran is now operating its centrifuges for longer periods and thus making significantly more 3.5 percent enriched uranium—one-third more in this past quarter than in the previous quarter. ISIS said that if Iran’s stock of low enriched uranium were further enriched to 90 percent, it would be enough for at least five nuclear weapons.
The 3.5 percent uranium is suitable for fueling nuclear power reactors. Iran has only one such reactor under construction. That one, at Bushehr, is fully fueled by Russia. Thus, Iran has no non-military use for all that enriched uranium at this time.
The government is enriching some uranium to as much as 19.75 percent to fuel the Tehran Research Reactor. But ISIS said Iran is already making far more 19.75 percent uranium than it needs to keep the Tehran reactor fueled and that 19.75 percent uranium is just stacking up. While 19.75 percent uranium sounds a far distance from the 90 percent needed for a weapon, nuclear scientists point out that 97 percent of the effort needed to convert uranium to weapons grade has already been expended once uranium is enriched to 19.75 percent.
The IAEA report generally painted a picture of Iran as unresponsive and foot-dragging:
• “The Agency presented Iran with initial questions on Parchin [where nuclear work is suspected but denied by Iran] and the foreign expert [who reportedly helped Iran on weapons work], to which the agency has yet to receive answers.”
• Regarding plans for building new nuclear power plants, “Iran has not provided information as requested by the agency in its letter of 18 August 2010,” almost two years ago. “As a result of Iran’s lack of cooperation on those issues, the agency is unable to verify and report on these matters.”
• “The agency has sent three letters to Iran requesting further access to HWPP [the Heavy Water Production Plant at Arak]. The agency has yet to receive a reply to those letters.”
• “Iran last provided the agency with a DIQ [Design Information Questionnaire] for the IR-40 reactor [at Arak] in 2006Ö. The lack of up-to-date information on the reactor is now having an adverse impact on the agency’s ability to effectively verify the design of the facility.”
• “As Iran is not providing the necessary cooperation,Ö the agency is unable to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran.”
Ali-Asghar Soltanieh, Iran’s ambassador to the IAEA, gave the official reaction to the quarterly report, saying, it “is more proof of the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear activities and of our country’s . . . full cooperation with the agency.”