The elections have also left the reformists an even more hollow force than before. The reformists held about 15 percent of the seats in the outgoing Majlis and played no real role. They are now reduced to a mere 7 percent of the seats.
The biggest single bloc in the Majlis—if it can be called a bloc—is the independents. More than one-third of those elected had signed up with no faction, according to a tabulation done by Agence France Presse.
Many of them are people who are locally prominent. They owe their elections to no one in Tehran and are free to do as they choose. In Iran, it is very important for Majlis deputies to show their constituents that they can bring pork—dams, highways, sports centers and other 
construction projects—home to their districts. The decisions on such projects are made by the administration; thus, President Ahmadi-nejad will have some leverage over these independents.
Most of the media attention looked at the election as a brawl between supporters and opponents of the president. To a certain extent, that was true, but mainly in Tehran. In the capital, all but two of the 30 men and women elected deputies were endorsed by one or the other—or both—of the two main slates. But outside the capital, that neat division did not prevail.
The chief slate was the United Principleists Front that encompassed most of the leadership of the outgoing Majlis, including Speaker Ali Larijani and the two men who were probably the best organizers and workhorses of the last Majlis—Ahmad Tavakkoli and Mohammad-Reza Bahonar. All three were re-elected.
The organizers of that slate had hoped it would be the sole mainstream conservative slate and would oppose a slate put up by President Ahmadi-nejad, thus setting up a showdown between conservatives backing and opposing the president. In the end, however, Ahmadi-nejad backed off such a confrontation and endorsed no one, playing no role in the Majlis 
balloting and effectively conceding that he could not prevail.
But Ayatollah Mohammad-Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi, an ultra-conservative firebrand, sponsored a slate opposed to the United Principleists. It was tabbed by many in the media as the pro-Ahmadi-nejad slate. And it did include many vocal Ahmadi-nejad supporters. But it also included some people who had left the Ahmadi-nejad Administration under a cloud. They are not fans of the president, but are fans of executive authority and are critical of the way the United Principleists have tried to make the legislature superior to the executive. Some of those on the Mesbah-Yazdi slate have been publicly very critical of Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai, the president’s chief of staff and closest political deputy. The president would certainly not consider such Mashai bashers to be political allies.
Mesbah-Yazdi’s slate never specifically endorsed the president and his policies. But the bulk of his supporters in the outgoing Majlis were on the Mesbah-Yazdi slate and it was generally perceived by the public—at least in Tehran—as the slate backing the president.
The inability for political precision is perhaps best shown by the example of Masud Mir-Kazemi, who was fired as oil minister last year by Ahmadi-nejad and is no lover of the president. He won election in the first round of voting in March with the endorsement of the United Principleists. But he was also endorsed by the Mesbah-Yazdi slate, the supposed pro-Ahmadi-nejad slate.
As has always been the norm in Iran, many candidates have been double-endorsed by both of the major slates. In this election, 151 of the deputies elected—barely half of the 290 seats—had an endorsement from at least one of the two main slates. That left 48 percent who had nothing to do with either major slate.
Of those 151, 65 were endorsed only by the United Principleists, 25 only by the Mesbah-Yazdi slate and 61 were endorsed by both slates. But where do the double-endorsees stand on President Ahmadi-nejad? That is an unknown.
It was common for the Western media to portray the election as a vote for or against Ahmadi-nejad. For example, the Associated Press wrote that the election results were “a new humiliation for Ahmadi-nejad.” But that was an over-simplification if not outright erroneous. The Western media widely portrayed the outcome as a defeat for Ahmadi-nejad. But the president had actually conceded defeat back in February when he decided not to form any slate of his own backers.
In reality, the elections do not appear to have changed very much.
The outgoing Majlis had a conservative majority with an ineffective reformist rump. And on most issues the majority opposed the president and the most active leaders were largely hostile to the president.
The incoming Majlis will have a conservative majority with an even smaller ineffective reformist rump. On most issues, the majority is likely to oppose the president. And the most active members who were largely hostile to him in the last Majlis are back.
The vote in Tehran was different than the vote elsewhere around the country. This is not uncommon; Tehran is a very political city. Issues—and slates—are crafted in Tehran. Much of the rest of the country is more interested in local issues and not especially enthralled by what comes out of Tehran.
In Tehran, not a single independent was elected, very unlike the rest of the country. And only six of those elected were doubly-endorsed by the two main factions (four in the runoffs Friday and two, who are not shone in the table, elected in the first round in March), again very unlike the rest of the country.
Neither of the two main factions dominated in Tehran, unlike the rest of the country. A glance down the large table accompanying this article shows the Tehran voters seemingly taking one from Column A and then one from Column B and back and forth again. The black boxes showing endorsements by the two main factions jump back and forth from one column to another.
Tehran gets to fill 30 Majlis seats. And every Tehrani gets 30 votes. Five seats were filled in the first round. Twenty-five seats were filled in Friday’s second round with 50 candidates running. The Interior Ministry said 1,126,489 Tehranis voted Friday. But the top vote-getter, Bijan Nobaveh-Vatan, only got 44 percent of the vote. That means few Tehranis voted for a full 25 candidates. In fact, the average voter didn’t even vote for a dozen candidates. They picked and chose the handful they knew.
It is probable that individual candidates told their close supporters to cast only one vote. This is called bullet-balloting. It helps the one candidate—but it isn’t a practice that any slate likes and doesn’t show any loyalty to the slate.
In Tehran, there was also a slate that combined the two reformists who made it into the runoffs and the two maverick conservatives who made it. Tehranis elected one maverick—Ali Motahari, a very vocal critic of the president—and a solitary reformist—Ali-Reza Mahjub, the leader of the Labor House. But Hassan Ghafuri-Fard, a maverick who has served in many previous Majlises, and Soheyla Jelodarzadeh, a respected reformist and feminist who survived the conservative sweep four years ago, went down to defeat.
The runoff elections made little difference in the outcome in Tehran. Of the candidates who finished in the top 30 in the first round, only two failed to win in the second round. The lowest person in the first round to win was the reformist, Mahjub, who placed 39th in the first round but inched to victory in the second round. Presumably, he was helped by reformists casting just one vote in the second round.
The new Majlis will meet for the first time May 27. One of its first tasks will be to elect a speaker. Opponents of incumbent Ali Larijani are already lining up to depose him. Many are talking about electing Gholam-Ali Haddad Adel, the man Larijani deposed four years ago. But both Larijani and Haddad-Adel were elected on the United Principleists slate. If they do in fact oppose one another for the speakership, it will demonstrate just how very loose such slates are in Iran.
And, in fact, several newly elected deputies are talking about forming new blocs within the Majlis. No sooner have they been elected than they forget all about the slate they ran on. But a key point is that they are trying to attract independents and form them into a group that can exert influence.
Zohreh Elahian, one of the more active women with the United Principleists, failed to win re-election in Tehran. She has been one of the loudest critics of the United States in the body, leaving no conspiracy theory unproclaimed.