The addendum to the quarterly report was titled, “Areas where Iran is not meeting its obligations.” What followed was a page-long list of 20 bullet points.
They ranged from the major and well-known refusal of Iran to implement the Additional Protocol to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, as called for by the UN Security Council, to more obscure elements such as Iran’s refusal to allow IAEA inspectors have access to Iran’s Heavy Water Production Plant.
This quarter’s report also added a new section entitled “Possible Military Dimension.” The report noted that Iran has called some materials given to the IAEA by the United States describing military work to be “forged and fabricated. The IAEA objected that Iran’s conclusion was based “on form rather than substance” and was not accepted.
Moreover, the IAEA said it has “recently” received more information supporting the contention that Iran had been conducting military work.
The IAEA then said:
“The Agency remains concerned about the possible existence in Iran of past or current undisclosed nuclear related activities involving military related organizations, including activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile.…
“The Agency has yet to receive a reply to its letter dated 29 October 2010, in which it again reiterated its concerns to Iran and provided a list of those matters which remain to be addressed.…
“The Agency has continued to request that Iran engage with the Agency on these issues, and that the Agency be permitted to visit all relevant sites, have access to all relevant equipment and documentation, and be allowed to interview all relevant persons, without further delay. The passage of time and the possible deterioration in the availability of some relevant information increase the urgency of this matter. Iran’s substantive and proactive engagement is essential to enable the Agency to make progress on its verification of the correctness and completeness of Iran’s declarations.”
It was the strongest statement yet on Iran’s non-compliance. Each report since Yukiya Amano took over as director general a little over a year ago has been slightly more strongly worded in its criticism of Iran for non-cooperation.
The report provided little support for those anticipating that the Stuxnet computer worm would bring the Natanz uranium enrichment plant to its knees. The report shows the number of centrifuges deployed to be continuing at a fairly steady level and production of low enriched uranium to be continuing at a fairly steady pace.
But the total number of centrifuges approached 9,000 a year and a half ago and yet has still not passed that level, although the main hall at Natanz is designed to hold 54,000 centrifuges.
That suggests to some that Stuxnet has had an impact. The number of installed centrifuges plunged by 2,000 in late 2009/early 2010, which may have been the result of the Stuxnet attack, and Iran has not installed appreciably more centrifuges than it had before that plunge. That suggests to some that Iran is still struggling to make its centrifuges work well, or perhaps is waiting until some more advanced centrifuge designs that it is now testing are ready to be installed.
